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ABSTRACT
Recent work has revived the Schumpeterian hypothesis that recessions facilitate innovation and
growth. But a major source of productivity growth, research and development, is actually procyclical.
This paper argues that while it is optimal to concentrate growth-enhancing activities in downturns,
dynamic spillovers inherent to the R&D process lead private agents to concentrate too much of their
R&D activity in booms, precisely when its social cost is highest. Thus, while previous literature has
argued recessions promote growth and intertemporal substitution is a desirable consequence of
fluctuations, in the case of R&D recessions discourage growth and intertemporal substitution proves
to be a social liability.
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Over the past decade, economists have resurrected the Schumpeterian notion that recessions
facilitate long-run economic growth. Modern reincarnations of this hypothesis are rooted in
theories of intertemporal substitution.1 That is, they assume that productivity-enhancing ac-
tivities compete with production activities for resources. Since the cost of growth-enhancing
activities in terms of forgone output or sales is lower in recessions, there will be incentive to
reallocate resources toward such activities in these periods. Recessions should therefore pro-
mote the use of resources in growth-enhancing activities, and it is even possible for cyclical
‡uctuations to increase welfare by allowing the economy to grow at a lower overall cost.
In contrast to the above theory, empirical evidence suggests that one of the major sources
of long-run productivity growth – research and development (henceforth R&D) – is in fact
procyclical. For example, Griliches (1990) reports that both R&D and its output, patents,
are higher in booms.2 Fatas (2000) similarly reports that growth in real R&D expenditures is
positively correlated with contemporaneous output growth in the U.S., although this correlation
has been less pronounced since the 1980s. More recently, Comin and Gertler (2004) argue that
R&D in the U.S. is especially procyclical at frequencies of between 8 and 50 years. That is, even
if R&D does not vary consistently with GDP growth at high frequencies, periods of sustained
low output growth are associated with sustained low R&D growth.
Why is R&D inconsistent with intertemporal substitution? One possibility is that contrary
to the theory, R&D does not compete with production for resources. As Aghion and Saint Paul
(1998) demonstrate, if R&D requires produced goods as opposed to factor inputs, the fact that
more goods are produced in booms allows for more R&D activity in upswings.3 But Aghion
and Saint Paul are also quick to dismiss this scenario. Indeed, as Griliches (1984) observes, the
1Examples include Hall (1991, 2000), Mortensen and Pissarides (1994), and Gomes, Greenwood, Rebelo (2001)
who study search; Cooper and Haltiwanger (1993), Aghion and Saint Paul (1998), and Canton and Uhlig (1999)
who study technical change; and DeJong and Ingram (2001), Dellas and Sakellaris (2003), and Barlevy and
Tsiddon (2004), who study human capital accumulation.
2The fact that patents are synchronized with the business cycle might seem surprising given the presumed
lags inherent to the research process. However, Griliches argues these lags are short, noting that “the evidence is
quite strong that when a …rm changes its R&D expenditures, parallel changes occur also in its patent numbers.
The relationship is close to contemporaneous with some lag e¤ects which are small and not well estimated
(Hall, Griliches, and Hausman, 1986). This is consistent with the observation that patents tend to be taken out
relatively early in the life of a research project.” (p1674).
3Following Rivera-Batiz and Romer (1991), this is known as the lab-equipment model. Comin and Gertler
(2004) also assume R&D uses …nal goods and note this assumption helps to generate procyclical R&D.
1main input into R&D is labor, not produced goods. Moreover, productivity in the goods sector
is procyclical, even after correcting for variable utilization as in Burnside, Eichenbaum, and
Rebelo (1993) and Basu (1996), while Griliches (1990) …nds productivity in the R&D sector
(with patents as a proxy for output) is acyclical. This suggests the economic cost of R&D is
lower in recessions. Reconciling between the theory and the data forces us to explain why R&D
is procyclical even though its opportunity cost is countercyclical.
This paper argues that the failure to take advantage of intertemporal substitution is due to a
distortion inherent to the R&D process. Speci…cally, when an innovator patents a new idea, he
reveals his insights to others and allows them to build on and further pro…t from these insights,
even at his own expense if their ideas render his original innovation obsolete. As already noted
by Grossman and Helpman (1991) and Aghion and Howitt (1992), the fact that innovators
cannot appropriate these indirect bene…ts can lead to too little steady-state R&D activity. But
there is also an important temporal aspect to this externality that previous work has ignored,
and which holds the key to why there might be a procyclical bias in equilibrium R&D.
To be more precise, since rival innovators are more likely to succeed in improving on an
innovation the more time they have to carry out their own R&D, the bene…ts from a new
discovery that pay o¤ further in the future are more likely to accrue to someone other than the
innovator who originated it. As a result, the incentives for innovators to engage in R&D will
largely depend on the short-term bene…ts of successful innovation. If pro…ts are procyclical, as
is true in the data, innovators chasing after short-term pro…ts will tend to concentrate relatively
more of their R&D in boom periods than is socially optimal. If pro…ts are su¢ciently procyclical,
as will be the case when production entails …xed costs, equilibrium R&D will turn procyclical,
even as optimal R&D remains countercyclical. Whereas previous work would suggest that the
ability to vary innovation activity over time is a virtue of aggregate ‡uctuations, this paper
suggests that entrepreneurs who are free to vary their innovation activity concentrate it at
precisely the wrong time and impose a social liability.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 1 reviews the evidence on the procyclicality of R&D
and argues that it cannot be explained away by …nancial constraints. Section 2 formalizes the
intuition for why equilibrium innovation su¤ers from a procyclical bias. Section 3 extends
these results in a more realistic environment that can be analyzed quantitatively. Section 4
conjectures whether the results would survive additional modi…cations such as di¤usion lags
and strategic delay. Section 5 concludes.
21. Empirical Evidence
I begin by reviewing the evidence on the cyclicality of R&D that I ultimately intend to explain.
Figure 1 plots the growth rate of real GDP against the growth rate of two measures of R&D
growth. First, as in previous work, I consider the growth rate of in‡ation-adjusted expenditures
on R&D performed and funded by private industry, as reported by the National Science Foun-
dation (NSF). I also use the growth rate of full-time equivalent R&D scientists and engineers
employed in companies performing R&D. This index is cruder in that it only considers part
of the inputs into R&D, but it has the advantage that it doesn’t depend on the price of R&D
inputs. This is important, since the only price index with which to de‡ate nominal expenditures
over the period as a whole is an aggregate index that may not accurately re‡ect changes in the
price of R&D inputs over the cycle.
As evident from the …gure, the two series track each other relatively closely. They also track
real GDP growth. Quite strikingly, the growth rate of R&D declines in nearly all of the NBER
recessions prior to 1980. However, the behavior of R&D in NBER recessions appears to be
less stable in the second half of the sample. For example, growth in R&D was essentially
‡at through the 1980 recession. While growth in R&D employment fell in the 1991 recession,
growth in R&D expenditures only started to decline after the recession ended. Conversely,
although R&D expenditures fell dramatically during the 2001 recession, employment growth
in R&D already began to decline several years earlier. But even if the exact timing does not
always correspond to NBER dating conventions between 1980 and 2002, R&D growth and GDP
growth remain positively correlated over this period as well.
Additional data on R&D expenditures comes from individual …rm …nancial statements. The
Standard & Poor’s Compustat database compiles such data for publicly traded companies.
Although this sample does not capture all of the R&D activity in the NSF data, large …rms
account for the vast majority of R&D activity, and so this sample should capture the bulk of
aggregate R&D. Figure 2 reports the average growth rate of real R&D over the previous year
among all …rms reporting positive R&D spending, together with private R&D as reported by
the NSF. The two series again track each other quite closely; if anything, R&D growth among
Compustat …rms is even more synchronized with the cycle, since unlike the NSF data, growth
in R&D expenditures among these …rms declines in both the 1958 and 1991 recessions.
A virtue of the Compustat database is that since it contains additional information on indi-
vidual …rms, we can use it to investigate certain hypotheses about the evolution of R&D over
the cycle. In particular, one potential explanation for the procyclical nature of R&D is that
3although …rms would like to concentrate their innovation in downturns, it is harder to …nance
these activities in downturns. Since R&D can only pay o¤ after initial investments are under-
taken, it may be particularly sensitive to …nancing constraints. To investigate this possibility, I
look at the growth of R&D expenditures among …rms that ought to be relatively unconstrained
in their borrowing. If credit market frictions account for the procyclical pattern in R&D, the
growth in R&D expenditures should appear less procyclical for this group.
I consider two measures of …nancial constraints. One measure is the cash ‡ow available to
the …rm, which would mitigate the need to borrow externally in order to …nance expenditures.
This leads me to consider the growth rate of R&D expenditures for …rms that report at least
$50 million of cash (in 1996 dollars) in the year in which they undertake R&D, i.e. the top
quintile of …rms as ranked by their cash ‡ow. An alternative measure is the net worth of a …rm,
which can be used as collateral against which the …rm can borrow. This leads me to consider
the growth rate of R&D expenditures for …rms that report at least $150 million in net worth
(in 1996 dollars) in the year in which they undertake R&D. Not surprisingly, there is a fair
degree of overlap in the two samples, although they are not identical. Figure 3 illustrates the
growth rate of real R&D expenditures for these two groups. The growth rate of R&D among
these relatively unconstrained …rms is actually more procyclical than for the sample as a whole,
and the growth rate of their R&D systematically falls in every NBER recession.
It therefore appears that even …rms that are free to concentrate their R&D in downturns
choose not to do so, despite evidence in the Introduction that the opportunity cost of R&D is
countercyclical. The next section explores why …rms might optimally behave this way.
2. A Model of Schumpeterian Growth
To analyze R&D choices over the cycle, I consider a variation of the Grossman and Helpman
(1991) quality-ladder model in which the relative productivity of the goods sector ‡uctuates
over time. For now, I impose restrictions on preferences and technology that provide analytical
tractability and help to convey the intuition for the results. I relax these in the next section.
The economy consists of a representative agent whose instantaneous utility is given by
U (Ct) = Ct (2.1)
I relax the assumption of risk neutrality in the next section. As will be clear below, it plays an
important but not essential role in the analysis. Utility is discounted at rate ½ per unit time.
4The agent is endowed with a constant labor endowment L pet unit time and an initial capital
stock normalized to one. Capital is not accumulable and does not depreciate, i.e. it is essentially
a …xed factor (e.g. land). This assumption will also be relaxed in the next section. Labor and
capital can be converted into consumption goods according to a two-stage process. First, labor
is converted into a series of intermediate goods indexed by j 2 [0;1]. Second, intermediate
goods are combined with capital to produce a non-storable consumption good.
For the production of consumption goods, I assume Kt units of capital and xjt units of each











is a Cobb-Douglas composite of the intermediate goods xjt. To capture the fact that produc-
tivity in the goods sector varies over time, I let zt follow a Markov switching process between
two states, Z1 ¸ Z0, with a constant hazard rate ¹. I treat these ‡uctuations as exogenous,
although one could potentially derive them endogenously.4
Turning next to the production for intermediate goods, I assume each good j 2 [0;1] can be
produced from labor according to a linear technology
xjt = ¸jtLjt (2.4)
where Ljt denotes the amount of labor employed in the production of good j at date t. The
coe¢cient ¸jt is given by
¸jt = ¸mjt (2.5)
where ¸ > 1 is a constant and mjt is an integer that denotes the generation of technology used
for producing good j at date t. Each good j starts out at generation mj0, respectively, but
agents can advance to higher-generation technologies by engaging in research. That is, starting
with generation mj, devoting Rj units of labor to research on good j gives rise to a hazard
ÁRj of discovering generation mj + 1 in the next instant, which will be more productive given





4For example, Benhabib and Farmer (1994) describe an economy with spillovers in which there are equilibria
where the scale of production, and thus the productivity of individual producers, ‡uctuates over time.
5denote the average generation across goods. Subject to certain regularity conditions, the law of
large numbers holds and implies _ Mt = ÁRt where Rt =
R 1
0 Rjtdj denotes aggregate employment
in R&D. In line with the evidence on the acyclicality of productivity in R&D sector cited in
the Introduction, I assume Á is …xed over time.
It will prove convenient to express the output of …nal goods directly in terms of labor resources.
Suppose each sector uses the same amount of labor, i.e. Ljt = L¡Rt. One can show that this
allocation is optimal and is satis…ed in equilibrium. Using the fact that the supply of capital is




¸Mt (L ¡ Rt)
¤1¡®
(2.6)
The indirect productivity of labor in terms of …nal goods thus depends on both an exogenous
term zt and an endogenous term ¸(1¡®)Mt. Assuming a two-stage production structure o¤ers a
convenient way to decompose the two terms: productivity in the …nal goods sector is exogenous
while productivity in the intermediate goods sector is endogenous (and responds to exogenous
changes in zt). The growth rate of the endogenous component of labor productivity is given by
d
dt
¸(1¡®)Mt = (1 ¡ ®) _ Mt ln¸ = (1 ¡ ®)ÁRt ln¸ (2.7)
Since the utility of the agent is …nite only if this growth rate does not exceed the discount rate
½, an optimal policy exists only if utility is bounded for any feasible innovation, i.e.
½ > (1 ¡ ®)ÁLln¸ (2.8)
It is clear from (2.6) and (2.7) that the essential tradeo¤ facing this economy is whether to use
labor resources to produce output or promote growth: faster growth requires a higher level of
Rt, but this leaves fewer resources for current consumption.5
In the next two subsections, I solve for the optimal and equilibrium paths of Rt and argue
that equilibrium R&D su¤ers from a procyclical bias, i.e. there is too much R&D activity in
booms than is socially optimal. Nevertheless, equilibrium R&D is countercyclical. The reason
for this is that the model counterfactually predicts equilibrium pro…ts are just as volatile as
the cost of R&D. To understand why R&D might be procyclical, then, it is essential to also
understand why pro…ts are so volatile over the cycle. In the last subsection, I argue that the
high volatility of pro…ts is due to the presence of …xed costs, which my analysis ignores. When
I incorporate …xed costs into the analysis, equilibrium R&D will turn procyclical, even though
the optimal path is countercyclical.
5One might ask whether specialized labor employed in R&D is really a substitute for production workers.
While some R&D expenditures involve scientists and engineers who may not be easily shifted to production,
NSF data suggests that on average 40% of wage payments in R&D is allocated to support sta¤.
62.1. The Social Planner’s Problem
The neo-Schumpeterian view argues that concentrating innovation in periods of low produc-
tivity in the goods sector is desirable because it helps to reduce the overall cost of achieving
productivity growth. Solving the planning problem that maximizes the utility of the agent
con…rms this intuition. Formally, let Zi for i 2 f0;1g denote the initial level of productivity
and recall that M0 denotes the initial value of the average generation across all goods. The
expected utility of the agent under the optimal path starting from z0 = Zi is given by







¸Mt (L ¡ Rt)
¤1¡®
e¡½tdt
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ z0 = Zi
¸
(2.9)
subject to the constraint
_ Mt = ÁRt
We can rewrite (2.9) recursively as
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where V¡i (M) denotes the function evaluated at the level of productivity other than Zi. Given
the stationarity of the environment, the planner will choose a constant level of employment R
for a given Zi. Thus, the task of …nding an optimal policy reduces to …nding a pair of numbers
(R0;R1). The next proposition establishes the existence of an optimal path and argues it will
undertake more innovation when productivity in the …nal goods sector is low. It is a special
case of the more general Proposition 3 below. The proof of that proposition, along with those
of all remaining propositions, is contained in an Appendix.
Proposition 1: If (2.8) is satis…ed, there exists a unique solution to the social planner’s
problem, and innovation is (weakly) countercyclical along the optimal path, i.e. R0 ¸ R1.
It should be noted that while concentrating innovation when zt is low allows the economy to
achieve growth at a lower cost, it also makes output more volatile: fewer inputs will be allocated
to the production of goods precisely when productivity in that sector is already low. This is
irrelevant given the agent is assumed to be risk neutral. But it will matter when the agent is
risk averse, as I assume in the next section.
2.2. Decentralized Equilibrium
I now turn to the decentralized equilibrium of this economy. Production is assumed to be carried
out by pro…t-maximizing …rms. The technology for producing …nal goods is freely available, so
7pro…ts in this sector will equal zero in equilibrium. Intermediate goods producers, by contrast,
enjoy some degree of market power; the entrepreneur that discovers the m-th generation for
producing good j maintains a patent that grants him exclusive rights to use this technology.
Since no …rm would undertake innovation without patent protection, some monopoly power is
necessary to sustain growth.
An equilibrium is a set of prices and quantities that are consistent with individual optimization
and market clearing. Since the demand for intermediate goods is unit elastic under the Cobb-
Douglas aggregator X, it will be optimal for an intermediate-goods producer to charge as high
a price as possible. However, he cannot charge more than the marginal cost of his next most
e¢cient competitor, or else the latter will steal away his business. In equilibrium, then, only
the monopolist with the most productive technology will supply goods, at a price pjt equal
to the marginal cost of his most e¢cient competitor. As Grossman and Helpman observe,
incumbent producers bene…t less from extending their lead than new entrants bene…t from
overtaking the lead, so only entrants engage in innovation in equilibrium. Hence, the next most
e¢cient producer will use the (mjt ¡ 1)-th generation technology.6 Normalizing the wage to 1,
the marginal cost of the next most e¢cient producer is ¸¡(mjt¡1), the number of labor units he
requires to produce a unit of good j.
Let ejt = pjtxjt denote total expenditures by …nal goods producers on intermediate good j.
Given the Cobb-Douglas speci…cation for X, …nal goods producers will equalize expenditures
across intermediate good j, i.e.
ejt = (1 ¡®)PtYt ´ et
where Pt denotes the price of the …nal good. With the wage normalized to 1, the cost of
production is just the number of employed workers ¸¡mjtxjt. Since xjt = et=pjt, this cost is
equal to ¸¡1et. Hence, the pro…ts of the incumbent …rm that supplies good j are given by




Note that pro…ts are the same for all intermediate goods, regardless of mjt. Since total spending
on consumption goods must equal the income of the representative agent in equilibrium, we
can express PtYt as the sum of aggregate pro…ts ¦t and payments to factors,




¼jtdj ¡ Rt + rtK + L (2.11)
6As in Grossman and Helpman (1991), this requires that R&D expenditures are unobservable, so an incumbent
has no incentive to undertake R&D simply to discourage potential entry.
8where rt denotes the rental rate on capital at date t. Substituting in for ¼jt and using the fact
that rtK = ®PtYt allows us to express individual pro…ts ¼jt in terms of Rt:
¼jt = (¸ ¡ 1)(L ¡ Rt) (2.12)
Note that nominal pro…ts do not depend on zt. This implies that for a …xed level of innovation
R, the ratio of pro…ts to the numeraire good, labor, is constant over the cycle. In practice,
though, pro…ts are far more volatile than the cost of labor (or more precisely than the cost of
R&D). This observation will …gure prominently below.
Entrepreneurs who succeed in innovation earn pro…ts (2.12) as long as their technology is the
most advanced. To calculate the value of a successful innovation, let Ijt denote an indicator
which equals 1 if the entrepreneur is the leading-edge producer of good j and zero otherwise,
and vj denote the value to a claim on the pro…ts of a successful innovation at date 0. Since
the representative agent owns all claims in equilibrium, the price vj must leave him indi¤erent

















¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ z0
¸
(2.13)
where the expectation above is taken over all possible paths for zt and Ijt. Non-incumbent
…rms choose Rj to maximize the expected value from a successful innovation net of R&D costs
ÁRjvj ¡ Rj. It follows that Ávj · 1 in equilibrium, with strict equality if Rj > 0. I limit
attention to symmetric equilibria in which Rjt is the same for all goods j, i.e. Rjt = Rt.
Since pro…ts ¼t are the same for all intermediate goods, this ensures the value of a successful
innovation vj will be the same for all j, i.e. vj = v. I further limit attention to Markov-perfect
equilibria in which Rt is constant for a given productivity level zt. Such an equilibrium can be
summarized by a pair of numbers (R0;R1). Since this is also true of the optimal path, it seems
natural to focus on such equilibria.
I now proceed to express the value of a successful innovation v above strictly in terms of
(R0;R1). To do this, I need to …rst express the price of …nal goods Pt in terms of Rt. Since
the production of …nal goods is competitive, the price P equals the minimum cost to produce




















Using this, the value of a successful innovation vi if initial productivity z0 = Zi is given by




(¸ ¡ 1)(L ¡ Rt)
Pt
e¡½tdt
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ z0 = Zi
¸





¸Mt (L ¡ Rt)
¤1¡®
e¡½tdt
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ z0 = Zi
¸
(2.15)
Note the similarity between (2.15) and (2.9). The real value an entrepreneur assigns to a
successful innovation (after dividing by the price of goods at date 0) is proportional to expected
discounted output. One can show that the real value a social planner assigns to a successful
innovation is likewise proportional to expected discounted output, but as given by (2.9). Since
the probability that It = 1 decreases with t, i.e. an incumbent is less likely to remain the leader
the more time has passed, output produced further in the future is more heavily discounted
under (2.15) than under (2.9).
This last observation lies at the heart of why the decentralized economy can fail to optimally
substitute over the cycle. Suppose it were optimal to maintain a countercyclical path for
innovation, i.e. to set R0 > R1. This insures output will be higher in booms than in recessions,
i.e. Z1(L ¡ R1)
1¡® > Z0(L ¡R0)
1¡®. At the same time, the fact that fztg is stationary implies
lim
t!1
E[zt (L ¡ Rt)
1¡® j z0 = Zi] does not depend on Zi. As we lower the discount rate and
give more weight to the future, the expected present discounted value of output given z0 = Z0
will converge to the expected value given z0 = Z1 and the ratio v1=v0 will fall. Conversely,
as we increase the discount rate and give more weight to the present, these two expressions
will diverge and the ratio v1=v0 will rise. Since private agents discount output more heavily
than the social planner, the ratio v1=v0 will tend to be higher in the decentralized economy.
In response, entrepreneurs will concentrate more of their innovation activity in booms, and
equilibrium innovation will exhibit a procyclical bias relative to the social optimum.
Returning to the task of deriving an explicit expression for vi, note that for any zt-measurable
function X (¢), the value of the integral
Wi (M0) = E
·Z 1
0
It ¢ ¸(1¡®)MtX (zt)e¡½tdt
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ z0 = Zi
¸
where _ Mt = ÁRt can be characterized by the recursive equation







10The method of undetermined coe¢cients con…rms that Wi (M) = wi¸(1¡®)M such that
wi =
!(R¡i)X (Zi) +¹X (Z¡i)
!(Ri)!(R¡i) ¡ ¹2
where
!(R) = ½ + ¹ + (1 ¡ (1 ¡ ®)ln¸)ÁR
The value of a successful innovation vi can therefore be expressed in terms of R0 and R1, i.e.
vi (Ri;R¡i) = (¸ ¡ 1)







Solving for a symmetric Markov-perfect equilibrium amounts to looking for pairs (R0;R1) in
[0;L]
2 such that Ávi (Ri;R¡i) · 1, with strict equality if Ri > 0. The next proposition shows
that despite the procyclical bias in equilibrium innovation, R&D is countercyclical.7
Proposition 2: Innovation along the equilibrium path is weakly countercyclical in any
symmetric Markov-perfect equilibrium, i.e. R0 ¸ R1 along any equilibrium path. Moreover, if
¸ < e
1
1¡®, there exists a unique symmetric Markov-perfect equilibrium.
The fact that equilibrium innovation remains countercyclical is related to my earlier observa-
tion that equilibrium pro…ts are just as volatile as the numeraire good, i.e. pro…ts and the cost
of R&D fall by the same degree in recessions. In contemplating whether to undertake more
innovation, entrepreneurs compare the cost of R&D not to current pro…ts but to the expected
discounted value of all future pro…ts. Since zt is stationary, expected future pro…ts fall less than
current pro…ts. Consequently, the discounted value of an innovation will fall by less than the
cost of innovation, providing incentive to undertake more innovation in recessions.
Empirically, of course, pro…ts are far more volatile than the cost of R&D. Mans…eld (1987)
constructs R&D price indices between 1969 to 1983 and …nds that the R&D de‡ator is closely
synchronized with the GDP de‡ator at high frequencies, implying real R&D costs are not very
cyclical. This is not surprising given that nearly half of R&D expenditures go to labor, and real
wages are only mildly procyclical. By contrast, pro…ts are strongly procyclical. The fact that
the bias in equilibrium R&D is not enough to turn it procyclical thus stems from the model’s
inability to match the high relative volatility of pro…ts we observe in the data. This prompts
me to examine what is absent from the preceding analysis that would account for why pro…ts
are so highly procyclical in the data.
7Canton and Uhlig (1999) also prove that equilibrium innovation is countercyclical in a similar model. Aghion
and Saint Paul (1998) prove equilibrium innovation is countercyclical in a related model, but they assume only
one …rm undertakes all innovation, so there is no externality that would lead to a procyclical bias.
112.3. Fixed Costs and the Volatility of Pro…ts
An important clue to what the analysis above might be missing is the fact that pro…ts in the






which is constant in the model. But empirically the ratio of aggregate pro…ts to aggregate sales
is strongly procyclical, a point emphasized by Ramey (1991). Since empirical evidence suggests
that the aggregate markup
1
¸
is either acyclical or moderately countercyclical, Ramey argues
that the fact that pro…ts are more volatile than sales points to the presence of some underlying
…xed costs of production, i.e. costs that do not vary with sales. Indeed, if producers had to pay













which is increasing in et and can thus be procyclical. In what follows, then, I allow for the
possibility that intermediate goods producers incur a …xed cost when producing their goods.
More precisely, producers must face a cost that is …xed with respect to business cycle ‡uc-
tuations, not just with respect to changes in the amount they produce or sell. To illustrate
this distinction, suppose each producer had to hire K workers to run the …rm regardless of how
much is produced. By de…nition, the cost of this labor is …xed with respect to the amount
produced. But if real wages are procyclical, this cost will vary with aggregate productivity. In
fact, since real wages in the model are just as volatile as sales, the pro…t-to-sales ratio (2.17)
remains constant even with overhead labor. Empirically, real wages are actually less volatile
than sales. We could modify the model to accord with this observation as well.8 But rather
than substantially complicate matters, I pursue an equivalent approach that is more convenient
expositionally: I assume that to run the …rm, each intermediate-goods producer must purchase
K units of the …nal good. At the level of the …rm, how we specify costs is irrelevant: an individ-
ual producer doesn’t care whether he has to purchase a …xed number of goods or pay overhead
workers a salary equal to this amount. But the way we specify …xed costs does matter at the
aggregate level, which requires some care in the way I specify these …xed costs.
8For example, suppose workers have access to a backyard technology that allows them to produce b¸
M(1¡®)
units of output on their own, where b is small but positive. Bargaining frictions that tie down the worker’s wage
to his outside option would make wages less volatile than sales. For an example of a related R&D growth model
with this type of bargaining friction, see Mortensen (2004).
12First, I assume the number of units K …rms purchase grows with the rest of the economy, i.e.
Kt = ¸(1¡®)Mt· (2.18)
for some constant ·. This assumption is meant to proxy for the fact that when …rms hire
workers rather than goods, their costs naturally grow with aggregate labor productivity.
Second, I assume that once an incumbent incurs the …xed cost, potential entrants who wish to
compete against him can avoid paying it themselves; for example, rather than spend resources
recruiting and training workers, an entrant could hire away the incumbent’s workers. To see
why this assumption is necessary, suppose all producers had to pay the …xed cost. In this case,
each additional dollar in …xed costs allows the incumbent to increase his price slightly without
the threat of entry, enough to earn an additional ¸¡1 dollars. Moreover, each additional dollar
in …xed costs increases the equilibrium sales of all producers by a dollar, since …nal goods
producers need to purchase intermediate goods to produce the …nal goods used to cover …xed
costs. This increases equilibrium pro…ts by 1¡¸¡1 dollars. Thus, for every dollar the …rm loses
in …xed costs, it gains a dollar in higher gross pro…ts, leaving equilibrium pro…ts unchanged.
By contrast, if …rms hired a …xed number of workers rather than goods, the amount they spent
on …xed costs would have no e¤ect on equilibrium sales, so …xed costs would lower equilibrium
pro…ts even when all …rms incur such costs. Suppressing the e¤ect of the …xed cost on the
price an incumbent can charge only serves to o¤set the e¤ects of assuming …rms purchase goods
rather than labor to cover their overhead.
Consider the planner’s problem in the presence of these …xed costs. The analog to equation
(2.10) is given by
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The presence of the …xed cost a¤ects the planner’s problem, since he would take into account the
e¤ect of faster innovation on the …xed cost (as he also would if …xed costs were denominated
in units of labor). While this changes the optimal level of innovation, there is no reason it
should a¤ect the timing of innovation with respect to zt. The next proposition con…rms that
the optimal path is indeed countercyclical at an interior optimum.
Proposition 3: If (2.8) is satis…ed, there exists a unique solution to the social planner’s
problem. If the optimal path dictates Ri > 0 for all i, then optimal innovation must be
countercyclical, i.e. R0 > R1 > 0. If the optimal path dictates Ri = 0 for some i, then the
optimal path is guaranteed to be weakly countercyclical, i.e. R0 ¸ R1 = 0, if · is small.
13Next, I turn to the decentralized economy. Given my assumptions, the incumbent producer





Once again, we can express pro…ts directly in terms of Rt using the aggregate resource con-
straint. However, the original constraint in (2.11) must be revised to re‡ect the fact that the
household only purchases those goods that are not used by intermediate goods producers, i.e.
Pt (Yt ¡ Kt) = ¦t + rtK + L (2.21)
Substituting this aggregate resource constraint into the expression for pro…ts yields
¼jt = (¸ ¡ 1)(L ¡ Rt) ¡ PtKt (2.22)
instead of (2.12). Solving for the aggregate price Pt, which turns out to be identical to the
expression in (2.14), we obtain the following as the value of a successful innovation:
vi (Ri;R¡i) = (¸ ¡ 1)













Since pro…ts are now more volatile than the cost of the numeraire good, as evident by the
presence of Zi, we would expect equilibrium R&D to turn procyclical for a su¢ciently large
…xed cost. To con…rm this conjecture, I begin with the following lemma:
Lemma: Suppose ¸ < e
1
1¡®. Then for any · > 0, there exists a unique R¤ < L such that
Áv0 (R¤;R¤) = Áv1(R¤;R¤). Moreover, there exists a ·¤ > 0 such that Ávi (R¤;R¤) < 1 for
· < ·¤ and Ávi (R¤;R¤) > 1 for · > ·¤.
The lemma above establishes that for any …xed cost ·, there is a unique level of innovation
R¤ that leaves the nominal value of a successful innovation v constant over the cycle. From
the proof of the lemma, one can show that this value v(R¤;R¤) increases with ·, ranging from
0 to in…nity, so that there must be some ·¤ for which it equals 1=Á. As the next proposition
establishes, if · is greater than ·¤, we are assured of …nding a pair (R0;R1) where R1 > R0
and which satis…es the condition that Ávi (Ri;R¡i) = 1 for both i 2 f0;1g.
Proposition 4: Suppose ¸ < e
1
1¡®. If · > ·¤, where ·¤ is de…ned in Lemma 2 , there exists
a pair (R0;R1) where R0 < R1 < L such that Ávi (Ri;R¡i) = 1.
14Proposition 4 suggests that for su¢ciently large …xed costs, equilibrium innovation will covary
positively with productivity.9 More precisely, it implies that for su¢ciently large …xed costs, we
can always …nd a solution for the system of equations that characterize an interior equilibrium
such that R1 > R0. However, this is not enough to establish either the existence or uniqueness
of an equilibrium with procyclical innovation. With regard to existence, Proposition 4 does not
guarantee that the solution (R0;R1) lies in [0;L]
2 and is hence a proper equilibrium. However,
for large enough values of L, the solution above appears to lie in [0;L]
2, mirroring a result in
Grossman and Helpman (1991) for the case of no …xed cost. With regard to uniqueness, the set
f(R0;R1) j Ávi (Ri;R¡i) = 1g can have multiple solutions. However, additional solutions do
not appear to correspond to equilibria; rather, they appear to involve high levels of innovation
for which the revenue of intermediate goods producers does not cover their …xed costs. For all
parameter values I experimented with, the procyclical equilibrium in Proposition 4 remained
unique even when more than one solution could be found.
In sum, since the bene…ts to innovation that pay o¤ in the future are more likely to accrue
to someone other than the original innovator, entrepreneurs act short-sightedly and fail to
respond optimally to aggregate shocks. This ine¢ciency is distinct from previous work which
has established that long-run growth may be suboptimally too high or too low; the results here
concern the relative level of R&D over the cycle rather than the absolute long-run level. For this
distortion to account for the procyclicality of R&D, it is important that producers face large
…xed costs so that pro…ts are su¢ciently volatile over the business cycle. A natural question is
whether empirically plausible …xed costs are enough to account for the procyclicality of R&D
in the data. To address this question, I …rst need to relax some of the assumptions above to
make the model more amenable to quantitative analysis, a task I take up in the next section.
Since one of these assumptions concerns risk neutrality, it is worth pausing to note that
although unrealistic, risk neutrality does serve to illustrate some of the model’s more dramatic
welfare implications. Consider the welfare e¤ects of aggregate volatility, i.e. the e¤ect of moving
from an economy with constant productivity Z to one in which zt ‡uctuates between Z0 and
Z1 but E (zt) = Z. In the stable environment, the optimal path mandates a constant level
of R. Under risk neutrality, the planner can always achieve the same expected utility in the
stochastic environment by adopting the same R. Proposition 3 then implies that the planner
can do strictly better in the volatile environment. By contrast, in the decentralized economy
where R&D can be procyclical, welfare may be lower in the volatile environment. Hence, cyclical
9One has to be careful about referring to this variation as procyclical, since with procyclical R&D one cannot
rule out that output falls when productivity z rises. In all the numerical simulations I tried, output varied
positively with productivity.
15‡uctuations can reduce welfare even when they allow a benevolent planner to achieve a higher
level of utility. When I move to a more reasonable utility speci…cation in the next section, the
planner will no longer be able to achieve higher utility in the more volatile environment, i.e.
business cycles are costly. But it will still be the case that cyclical ‡uctuations make it more
costly to achieve growth even when they allow the planner to achieve growth at a lower overall
cost. When I calibrate the model in the next section, I can provide a sense of how much this
increase in the cost of growth magni…es the welfare cost of cyclical ‡uctuations.
3. Schumpeterian Growth with Concave Utility and Accumulable Capital
As noted in the previous section, concentrating innovation in recessions lowers the average cost
of growth but increases the volatility of output. Under the assumption of risk neutrality, this
volatility is inconsequential. However, when the utility function exhibits curvature, the fact that
countercyclical innovation increases volatility may make it undesirable. This section therefore
modi…es the model to allow for concave utility, and examines whether procyclical innovation is
still ine¢cient under empirically plausible assumptions.
In introducing risk aversion, it will be important to also relax the assumption that capital
is not accumulable. Otherwise, the only way to smooth consumption over the cycle would
be to vary R&D with productivity, implying procyclical R&D may in fact be optimal. In
practice, though, there are other options to smooth consumption such as inventories and capital
accumulation, and since these activities do not occur at the expense of current production, they
presumably dominate R&D for purposes of consumption smoothing.
Formally, I modify the model in two ways. First, I replace (2.1) with a more reasonable utility
U (Ct) = lnCt (3.1)
With log utility, there is no longer a need to restrict ½ as in (2.8). Second, I replace the
assumption that Kt ´ 1 for all t with the assumption that capital satis…es the law of motion
_ Kt = It ¡ ±Kt (3.2)
where It denotes investment, i.e. the part of net output that is not consumed by the household,
and ± denotes the depreciation rate for capital. Finally, to ensure that the economy does not
outgrow its …xed cost in the presence of capital accumulation, I replace (2.18) with
Kt = ¸Mt· (3.3)
16That is, the economy now grows at the rate _ M ln¸ as opposed to (1 ¡ ®) _ M ln¸.
While these modi…cations are simple to describe, they greatly complicate the analysis by
introducing additional state variables. In the next two subsections, I sketch out how to derive
the optimal and equilibrium paths of R in this environment. I then solve the model numerically
for speci…c parameter values meant to replicate certain features of U.S. data, and show that the
main conclusions from the previous section survive, i.e. equilibrium innovation is ine¢ciently
procyclical at empirically plausible parameter values.
3.1. The Social Planner’s Problem
I begin with the planner’s problem. In lieu of (2.9), the planner’s problem is now given by












¡ It ¡ ¸Mt·
´
e¡½tdt
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ z0 = Zi
¸
s.t. 1. _ Mt = ÁRt
2. _ Kt = It ¡ ±Kt
To solve this problem, I …rst scale down certain variables by ¸M; speci…cally, let k = ¸¡MK
and ¶ = ¸¡MI. Using the law of motion for M, we can rewrite the above recursively as
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Combining the two …rst order conditions for this problem yields the following formula for Ri,
the value of R&D when productivity is equal to Zi:










Rather than two numbers R0 and R1, an optimal plan now corresponds to two functions R0(k)
and R1 (k). I will refer to a policy as procyclical if it assigns R1 (k) > R0 (k) for any k in the
limiting set of capital-to-productivity ratios for this economy, i.e. for any level of k that occurs
in…nitely often along the optimal path with probability 1, and countercyclical if R1(k) < R0(k)
for all such k. Note that this de…nition may not correspond to the way R&D would appear to
covary with zt in data generated by this model, since changes in capital accumulation over the
cycle may o¤set the response of R&D to changes in productivity for a …xed k.
17To solve for Ri (k), we need an expression for the value function vi (k). Since the system in
(3.4) does not yield a closed-form solution, I need to solve it numerically. My implementation
uses a collocation method whereby I approximate each vi (k) with a polynomial in k.10
3.2. Decentralized Equilibrium
Next, I characterize the equilibrium allocation. Certain features of the equilibrium remain un-
changed from the previous section. For example, each intermediate good producer will continue
to set his price to the marginal cost of his next most e¢cient competitor, i.e. pjt = ¸¡(mjt¡1).
As such, nominal pro…ts for each producer once again correspond to (2.22). The price of goods
P now corresponds to a slightly di¤erent expression from (2.14), namely
P =
¸1¡M (L ¡ R)
®
z (1 ¡®)k® (3.5)
As in the previous section, I only consider symmetric equilibria in which innovation is the
same across all sectors. To conform with equilibrium, the path for R must satisfy the free entry
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In the previous section, the discount factor applied to pro…ts could be expressed in closed form.
But given my new assumptions on preferences and technology, this discount factor no longer
admits a simple representation. Thus, rather than back out the path for R directly from the
condition that Áv = 1, I set out to solve the household maximization problem assuming Áv = 1,
and then …nd the path for R that reconciles the optimal solution with this free entry condition.
The household problem amounts to a portfolio allocation problem. At any point in time,
the household must decide how to divide its wealth between physical capital and claims on
the pro…ts of entrepreneurs. It does this taking as given the distribution of paths of future
prices, e.g. the price of capital, the instantaneous return on capital, the pro…ts it expects the
entrepreneurs whose claims it might own to earn, and so on. Once it realizes the returns on
its investment and earns its labor income, it chooses how much to consume and how much to
carry over as wealth to the next instant, when it repeats this decision.
10More precisely, I obtain an n-th order polynomial approximation of each function by choosing n+1 coe¢cients
such that when I replace the true vi (k) with the approximate function, (3.4) is exactly satis…ed at n + 1 values
of k, which are taken to be the roots of the …rst n + 1 Chevyshev polynomials adapted to the limiting interval
for k. The results reported in the paper are based on fourth-order polynomials.
18Since the household must hold the claims to all entrepreneurs in equilibrium, it will be
convenient to pretend as if there was a mutual fund company that pooled all entrepreneurs into
a single portfolio on behalf of the household. Arbitrage requires the value of this portfolio to
be the same as the cost of buying up all …rms, which is just
R 1
0 vdj = v. To insure the fund
continues to own all incumbents, it must pay the research expenses of any potential innovator
in exchange for the rights to the patent if the innovator is successful, i.e. the fund deducts an
operating expense R out of dividends. Thus, the household has the option to pay v for an asset
with a dividend of ¦ = ¼ ¡ R per unit time, where ¼ is given by (2.20).
Let w denote the household’s nominal wealth and ¾ denote the fraction of this wealth that
the household allocates to capital. The instantaneous change in the household’s nominal wealth
from its investments in physical capital derives from rental income and capital gains. As long
as aggregate productivity remains constant over the next instant, the return per unit of capital
is r + _ P, and the number of units of capital it holds is ¾w=P. Similarly, the instantaneous
change in the household’s nominal wealth from investments in the mutual fund derives from
fund dividends and capital gains. As long as aggregate productivity zt remains constant, the
free entry condition implies _ v = 0 so there are no capital gains on holding the mutual fund. The
return per share of the mutual fund is thus the dividend ¦, and the number of shares it owns
is (1 ¡¾)w=v. On top of the returns to these investments, the household earns labor income
which it adds to its wealth and spends some of its wealth on consumption. Thus, as long as zt














w + L ¡ ¸MPc (3.6)
If instead productivity zt changes discontinuously over the next instant, the wealth of the
household in physical capital will jump as the price of capital P jumps discretely with z. By
contrast, the nominal value of wealth held in the mutual fund will not change since the value
of the mutual fund v = Á¡1 is independent of aggregate productivity. In this case, the wealth





¾ + (1 ¡ ¾)
¸
w (3.7)
Let W denote the aggregate wealth of the economy. In equilibrium, w = W. However, since
individual households act as price takers, they treat the path of W as given and assume it
determines the values of all relevant economic variables. As such, solving for an equilibrium
amounts to …nding a pair of functions Ri (W), where the index i re‡ects the fact that this is
the amount of R&D at productivity Zi. Given the functions Ri (W), we can indeed derive all
19remaining equilibrium quantities. For example, using the fact that W = PK+v = ¸MPk+Á¡1
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Substituting in allows us to obtain the remaining nominal quantities r, P, and ¦ as functions
of W. This implies we can express the household problem recursively in terms of two state
variables, w and W:




















subject to (3.6) and (3.7), as well as the free entry condition Áv = 1, and the laws of motion
for W which correspond to
_ W =
³
r + _ P
´
¸Mk + ¦ + L ¡ ¸MPc(W;W) (3.9)
when zt remains constant over the next instant and a jump to W¤ if zt changes where
W¤ = ¸MP¡iki (W) + Á¡1























An equilibrium therefore reduces to the set of functions w¤
i (w), Vi (w;W), and Ri (W) which
satisfy equations (3.7), (3.8), and (3.10).
Again, I can only solve this equilibrium numerically. In particular, I approximate Ri (W)
and w¤
i (w) using n-th degree polynomials in W and w, respectively, and I approximate the





ak`wkW`. The coe¢cients of these polynomials
are chosen so that the equations above hold exactly at particular values of (w;W).11
11In particular, consider the set of points w (and W) that correspond to the roots of the Chebyshev polynomials
adapted to the limiting interval for w. I require equilibrium conditions to be satis…ed at fwi;Wjg1·i·j·n+1.
Note that I need to approximate V (w;W) on and o¤ the equilibrium path to di¤erentiate @Vi=@w from @Vi=@W.
203.3. Calibration and Results
I now proceed to solve the model for particular parameter values. Since this version of the
model corresponds to a standard real business cycle model with an endogenously determined
trend growth rate, I can build on previous literature in assigning most of its parameters. The
particular values I use are summarized in Table 1.
Table 1
½ 0:05 Z0 0:94 ¹ 0:20 ¸ 1:20 · 3:6
® 0:33 Z1 1:06 ± 0:08 Á 0:10 L 30:8
Normalizing a unit of time in the model to correspond to a year, the discount rate ½ is set to
5%. The share of capital in the production of …nal goods is set to one third. To accord with
an unconditional standard deviation of detrended productivity growth of 6%, I set Z0 to 0:94
and Z1 to 1:06: The transition rate ¹ is set so that the average length of a complete cycle is 10
years, slightly longer than the 8 year frequency often used to identify business cycle ‡uctuations.
The depreciation rate is set to 8% per year. For ¸, I follow Rotemberg and Woodford (1999)
in calibrating the markup to 20%. The productivity term Á turns out to be a pure scaling
parameter, so I normalize it to 0:10.
The remaining two parameters, · and L, are chosen to yield a growth rate of 2% per year
and a share of R&D in output of 2%, in accordance with the average share of total R&D
expenditures (private and public, since both can contribute to long-run growth) in GDP. It is
not obvious whether the model counterpart to the latter statistic is the share of R&D in gross
output or output net of the amount used by intermediate goods producers to cover …xed cost.
However, the di¤erence between the two measures is negligible for small values of ·; for · = 3:6,
R&D accounts for 2:0% of gross output and 2:2% of net output. Simulating the model for these
parameter values reveals that the model also generates reasonable time variation in R&D: the
standard deviation of R&D share is 13:9% and 13:6% for gross and net output respectively,
compared to 13:7% for total R&D between 1953 and 2002. However, this period was marked by
a steady shift in the composition of R&D from largely publicly funded in the 1950s to largely
privately funded by the 1990s, and it is not obvious that the incentives a¤ecting public R&D
over the business cycle correspond well to those in the model. Certainly the parameter values
in Table 1 do not imply implausibly volatile paths for R&D.
Measured against output, this value of · implies that …xed costs account for 8:1% of gross
output (and 8:8% of net output). By comparison, Basu (1996), following Ramey (1991), suggests
using non-production workers as a proxy for overhead labor. Non-production workers account
21for 20% of the labor force on average during the post-War period. Since labor accounts for
two-thirds of total output, this suggests an even larger overhead cost on the order of 13% of
output, so my value for · is if anything conservative.
Figure 4 plots both optimal and equilibrium Ri (k) for the parameter values in Table 1. In each
case, only the limiting set for k is depicted. The arrows indicate the law of motion for capital:
capital is decumulated in recessions and accumulated in booms. For the parameter values in
Table 1, optimal R&D policy is countercyclical. However, as more capital is accumulated, labor
resources can be freed up to be used for innovation, so some of the countercyclical pattern
in R&D will be undone by changes in the capital stock. Equilibrium R&D, by contrast, is
unambiguously procyclical, even after accounting for more rapid capital accumulation in booms.
Comparing the axes of the two panels in Figure 4 reveals that optimal R&D is an order of
magnitude larger than equilibrium R&D. This result mirrors the …ndings of Jones and Williams
(2000), although the wedge between optimal and equilibrium R&D is much larger here than in
their analysis. This is because Jones and Williams allow for diminishing returns to R&D; with
linear returns to R&D, the planner would want to devote almost all available labor resources to
innovation. As such, the social optimum in this model may be unreliable for carrying out welfare
analysis. However, we can still get a sense of the e¢ciency of procyclical equilibrium R&D by
appealing to perturbation analysis around the non-stochastic steady state, since the e¤ects of
small perturbations are insensitive to the degree of curvature in the R&D sector. Starting with
the case where Z0 = Z1 = 1 and the corresponding equilibrium R, consider a small perturbation
of aggregate productivity so that Z0 = 1¡" and Z1 = 1+" for " small. The key question is how
a perturbation from R to R0 = (1 ¡ "0)R and R1 = (1 + "0)R a¤ects welfare in response to a
perturbation in productivity. Numerical calculations con…rm that this perturbation is welfare
reducing for "0 > 0 and welfare enhancing for "0 < 0. Thus, the procyclicality of equilibrium
R&D in Figure 4 should indeed be viewed as suboptimal.
To gauge the magnitude of this ine¢ciency, consider the change in utility when moving from a
stable environment where Z0 = Z1 = 1 to a volatile environment where Z0 6= Z1. In both cases,
I evaluate utility starting at the deterministic steady-state level of k. Moreover, when zt is
stochastic, I evaluate utility at the invariant distribution of zt. Following Lucas (1987), we can
express the change in utility in terms of the fraction of lifetime consumption agents would be
willing to give up to avoid this ine¢ciency. By a standard Taylor approximation argument, the
cost of moving to a volatile environment is proportional to the variance of aggregate productivity
¾2
z. For the model as speci…ed, the constant of proportionality turns out to be approximately
equal to 1. We can then decompose this cost into a cost due to volatility in zt holding R&D
22…xed at its deterministic equilibrium level (but allowing agents to accumulate capital), and
a cost due to changes in equilibrium R&D. For the parameter values in Table 1, the cost of
volatility holding R&D …xed is approximately 1
3¾2
z. Thus, taking into account the ine¢cient
response of R&D to aggregate ‡uctuations fully triples the cost of business cycles relative to
models in which the growth rate is treated as exogenous and …xed. Evidently, failing to take
into account the endogenous response of growth to cyclical shocks can be quite misleading for
welfare analysis. However, rather than contributing to welfare as the Schumpeterian theory
would anticipate, the endogenous response of entrepreneurs magni…es the cost of ‡uctuations.
Of course, since ¾2
z empirically is rather small, the welfare cost of ‡uctuations remains small
even after taking into account the ine¢cient response of R&D. For example, for a standard
deviation of 6%, the cost of ‡uctuations is 0:36% of lifetime consumption. This is indeed about
three times as large as Lucas’ estimated cost of business cycles using direct evidence on con-
sumption (as opposed to calibrating to productivity shocks). However, there is reason to believe
that this estimate signi…cantly understates the true cost of the ine¢cient timing of R&D over
the cycle. This is because the model substantially underpredicts the volatility of trend growth
ÁRln¸. The standard deviation of trend growth in the model is about 0:2 percentage points.
By contrast, when Barlevy (2004) estimates the volatility of trend growth (i.e. after accounting
for changes in the level of economic activity), he …nds a standard deviation of 1:8 percentage
points. To be sure, not all of this variation is due to R&D. But the model does appear to gen-
erate too little volatility in trend growth relative to what we observe empirically. One reason
for this may be that, as is well-known, the preferences used in this paper yield insu¢ciently
volatile asset prices, including the value of a successful innovation v which ultimately drives
entrepreneurs to undertake R&D. Recent work has argued that allowing for time non-separable
preferences such as habit-persistence can help to reconcile RBC models with asset prices. An-
alyzing the model with this class of preferences, as well as allowing for diminishing returns to
R&D as in Jones and Williams (2000), is an important next step for getting a better sense of
the true cost of this ine¢ciency.
Finally, since the …xed cost · plays an essential role, some discussion of the robustness of
the results to changes in this parameter are in order. That is, how do the results change as
I vary · and adjust L to maintain a steady-state growth rate of 2% per year? As · is driven
to zero, equilibrium innovation indeed turns countercyclical. How large does · have to be for
R&D to be procyclical? For the parameters values in Table 1, the cuto¤ level above which
R&D is procyclical is approximately 3:3. This corresponds to a …xed cost of about 8:6% of
net output, i.e. …xed costs cannot be much smaller than those I calibrated. For larger values
of · than in Table 1, equilibrium R&D remains procyclical. Moreover, perturbation analysis
23con…rms that this procyclical pattern remains ine¢cient, even for much larger values of·. But
in contrast to the previous section, the optimal path for R&D that the planner chooses actually
turns procyclical for high values of ·. Intuitively, increasing · acts in a similar way to increasing
the curvature of the utility function, and at the optimal path the planner is essentially so risk-
averse that he will even use R&D to smooth consumption, especially given that the amount
of resources devoted to R&D at the optimal path is so large. But since the equilibrium R&D
share is never much larger than 2% for reasonable parameter values, there is little to gain from
using R&D to smooth consumption, and it remains optimal to concentrate R&D in recessions.
4. Extensions
Since the quality-ladder model used to analyze R&D decisions above abstracts from certain
important considerations, this section brie‡y raises some additional aspects concerning the
R&D process and speculates on how they might a¤ect my results.
One feature the model abstracts from is that innovations take time to bring to fruition,
so …rms should not expect to be able to bring their innovations on-line as soon as aggregate
conditions improve. Introducing di¤usion lags might make entrepreneurs reluctant to undertake
more innovation in booms given they are temporary. Formally, suppose an idea discovered
at date t can only be used for production at date t + T. By continuity, R&D will remain
procyclical for small T. For larger T, we would have to explicitly solve the model. This is quite
di¢cult, since the whole continuum of productivity levels [zt¡T;zt] enter as state variables.
But intuitively, R&D should remain procyclical given shocks are persistent. That is, since
Pr(zt+T = zt j zt) > Pr(zt+T 6= zt j zt), a potential entrant who is constrained to implement
his invention only after T units of time should still expect pro…ts at the time of implementation
to be higher starting in a boom than in a recession. Di¤usion lags mitigate the bene…ts to
procyclical R&D, but R&D should still be procyclical for su¢ciently large …xed costs.
Another feature the model abstracts from is the possibility that …rms strategically delay
implementing their innovations, a point raised by Shleifer (1986). This is particularly relevant
when aggregate productivity varies over time, since …rms can potentially undertake innovation
in recessions when the cost of R&D is low but wait until booms to implement them. While
this intuition is suggestive, allowing for strategic delay need not eliminate the ine¢cient timing
of innovation. This is best illustrated using the version of the model in Section 2. The next
Proposition provides conditions under which the equilibrium in Proposition 4 survives even
when …rms can strategically delay implementing their innovations:






. Then there exists a ·0 > ·¤ as de…ned
in Lemma 2 such that the (R0;R1) identi…ed in Proposition 4 remains an equilibrium for all
· 2 (·¤;·0) even when agents can implement their technology (and allow rivals to begin research
on the next generation) at a di¤erent time than when they discover it.
Intuitively, as long as the discount rate ½ is large and regime switches are infrequent so ¹
is small, it will not pay to delay innovation until a boom given the long expected wait until
it arrives. If the assumptions of Proposition 5 are not satis…ed, …rms might prefer to delay
implementation until aggregate productivity is high, and it is not obvious that the equilibrium
identi…ed in Proposition 4 survives. However, even if delayed implementation implies equi-
librium R&D must be countercyclical, innovation would presumably still exhibit a procyclical
bias. Moreover, such a model would likely imply that equilibrium implementation is ine¢-
ciently procyclical, even if equilibrium innovation is not (since delay is never socially e¢cient,
implementation and innovation should be fully synchronized). The ine¢cient timing of im-
plementation is related to results in Caballero and Hammour (1996), who show in a di¤erent
setting that the adoption of new technologies can be distorted in the presence of frictions.
Unfortunately, a rigorous analysis of the case of strategic delay in the presence of aggregate
‡uctuations proves to be quite di¢cult. While there is work by Francois and Lloyd-Ellis (2003)
on strategic delay in quality-ladder models when productivity is …xed, their approach cannot
be extended to the case of time-varying productivity.
Another weakness of the model is its failure to match job reallocation over the business cycle.
In the model, jobs reallocation occurs when a …rm succeeds in innovation and displaces an
incumbent. Thus, if equilibrium innovation is procyclical, job reallocation should be as well. But
empirically, Davis and Haltiwanger (1992) report that job reallocation is countercyclical, at least
in the manufacturing sector. This can potentially be addressed by introducing an additional
source of reallocation that is not related to innovation activity. For example, following Young
(1998) or Aghion and Saint Paul (1998), we can introduce a “horizontal” variety dimension in
addition to the “vertical” quality ladder dimension that is already present in the model. That is,
suppose labor is used to produce capital goods, where the number of di¤erent capital goods N
is endogenous, and these capital goods can in turn be used to produce each of the intermediate
good j 2 [0;1] as in the model above. If the number of capital goods N decreases with
productivity, say because fewer capital goods can be pro…tably produced at low productivity,
recessions will be associated with increased job reallocation to accommodate the smaller variety
of capital goods. As long as there were some friction to mitigate job creation, such as search
frictions or convex creation costs as in Caballero and Hammour (1996), booms would not
25be associated with a similar burst of job reallocation when variety increases. In this case,
a recession would trigger an immediate round of job reallocation, but job reallocation would
eventually decline with the decreased rate of creative destruction. This pattern is consistent
with recent evidence in Caballero and Hammour (2004) that recessions initially increase job
reallocation but lead to a decline in cumulative job reallocation at longer horizons.
5. Conclusion
In recent years, economists have argued that recessions encourage agents to seek out more
productive uses of resources, and that cycles may even be welfare-improving. Yet one of the
main ways in which agents arrive at more productive uses of resources, R&D e¤ort, appears to be
procyclical. This paper provides an explanation for why R&D might be procyclical even though,
as the neo-Schumpeterian view argues, it ought to be concentrated in recessions. Its results
reinforce recent work by Caballero and Hammour (2004), who also challenge the prevailing view
that recessions promote the reallocation of resources to more productive uses. They argue that
cumulative job reallocation is lower rather than higher following recessions, and that this fall in
reallocation is costly. This paper focuses on R&D rather than job reallocation, but it likewise
argues that recessions lead to lower rather than higher R&D activity, and that this decline in
R&D is costly. While Schumpeterian theory correctly predicts that recessions ought to act as
incubators for productivity growth, frictions – such as the dynamic spillovers outlined in this
paper, or the holdup problems emphasized by Caballero and Hammour – preclude recessions
from playing this role in practice.12
That said, there are papers in the literature – including some of my own work – that argue
recessions do in fact promote human capital accumulation and as such contribute to long-run
growth. Indeed, Betts and McFarland (1995) and Dellas and Sakellaris (2003) both …nd that
college enrollments are countercyclical, particularly in two-year colleges.13 Likewise, Sepulveda
(2002) …nds that employee training, both on and o¤-the-job, tends to be countercyclical. This
evidence is not inconsistent with the …ndings of this paper, since R&D if fundamentally dif-
ferent from human capital accumulation. In particular, while human capital may also involve
externalities – e.g. employers might capture some of the returns to human capital if the wage
12Relatedly, Barlevy (2002) argues search frictions prevent recessions from allocating resources to their best
uses, even though they should ameliorate productive ine¢ciency by cleansing less productive uses of resources.
13By contrast, King and Sweetman (2002) argue the number of workers who quit their job to return to school
is procyclical. But committing to school full-time is a special form of human capital accumulation, and may be
risky in recessions when job openings are scarce. Indeed, part-time college enrollment is countercyclical.
26distribution is somehow compressed – there is no comparable sense in which these externalities
are greater the more time that has passed since the worker acquired his skills. The fact that
an activity whose opportunity cost is also lower in recessions but is not subject to the same
distortions as R&D is concentrated in downturns accords with the view that, absent distortions,
R&D would likely be countercyclical.
The ine¢cient response of R&D to cyclical ‡uctuations outlined here suggests a new cost of
business cycles beyond the costs already noted in previous literature. It is certainly distinct
from the cost of volatility due to risk-aversion as emphasized in Lucas (1987) and subsequent
work that builds on his original insights. It is also distinct from previous work that argues
cycles are costly because of their e¤ect on growth, e.g. Barlevy (2004), since here the e¤ect
involves the timing of innovation rather than the level of innovation. The quantitative analysis
above suggests that this ine¢cient timing triples the cost of business cycles relative to models
in which growth is assumed to be una¤ected by cyclical ‡uctuations. This is more modest than
the costs cycles impose because of their e¤ect on the level of growth as reported in Barlevy
(2004); however, the estimated cost in this paper is likely to be understated given that trend
growth is more volatile than implied by the model. But even if the cost is much larger, it does
not necessarily follow that stabilization is desirable, since policymakers could always avoid this
cost by subsidizing R&D during recessions. In fact, since volatility may allow the economy to
grow at a lower overall cost, it may be distinctly undesirable to eliminate ‡uctuations, especially
for low degrees of risk aversion.
While this paper focuses primarily on cyclical ‡uctuations, it also contributes to the literature
on long-run growth. Whereas most of this literature only considers steady-state growth, this
paper tackles the more di¢cult case of non-steady-state dynamics. It reveals that spillovers
inherent to the R&D process can lead the economy to respond ine¢ciently to shocks around the
steady state, independently of whether the steady-state level is too high or too low. As such, it
suggests that ine¢cient growth is more pervasive than even previous work would suggest, since
even when the long-run steady state growth is e¢cient, i.e. the absolute level of innovation is
optimal, it might still be the case that the relative levels of innovation over time are suboptimal.
To put it another way, there may be scope for policymakers to intervene in the market for R&D
even when an analysis based only on steady-state comparisons would suggest a minimal role
for intervention.
27Appendix
Proof of Propositions 1 and 3: For given values R0 and R1, the system given by (2.10) reduces to
ordinary linear di¤erential equations in V (Zi;M). Standard theorems ensure this system has a unique
solution. Hence, for any conjectured values of Ri, we can use the method of undetermined coe¢cients
to …nd the unique value functions V (Zi;M) associated with a given pair (R0;R1). I conjecture that the
value function V (¢;¢) takes the form
V (Zi;M) = vi¸
M(1¡®)
Di¤erentiating this function with respect to M yields
@V
@M
= (1 ¡ ®)vi¸
M(1¡®) ln¸
which simpli…es the di¤erential equations above to a system of independent linear equations in the
coe¢cients vi:
½vi = Zi (L ¡ Ri)
1¡® ¡ · + ¹(v¡i ¡ vi) + (1 ¡ ®)viÁRi ln¸
This yields a unique solution (v0;v1) for any pair (R0;R1).
Since the RHS of (2.10) is strictly concave in Ri, the …rst order condition is both necessary and
su¢cient to characterize the optimal Ri. The …rst order condition is given by
¡(1 ¡ ®)Zi¸




Á · 0 (5.1)
with equality if Ri > 0. These …rst order conditions con…rm that an optimal policy reduces to a pair of

















If we substitute this expression into the asset equation (2.10), we obtain a pair of equations with v¡i as
a function of vi that hold at the optimal Ri:





























The optimal program corresponds to any pair (v¤
0;v¤
1) which solves the equations
v¤
1 = f1 (v¤
0)
v¤
0 = f0 (v¤
1)




are both equal to
½ + ¹
¹
. Since ½ > (1 ¡ ®)ÁLln¸, it follows that
@f¡i (vi)
@vi
> 1 for all
vi. The functions f¡i (¢) are illustrated in Figure A1, suggesting that there is a unique solution (v¤
0;v¤
1).To establish this formally, I use the fact that since
df¡i
dvi
> 0 for all vi , f¡i (¢) must be invertible. An
equilibrium thus corresponds to a value v¤
0 such that f1 (v¤
0)¡f¡1
0 (v¤
0) = 0. Di¤erentiating this condition


















This monotonicity insures there is at most one equilibrium v¤
0. To establish existence, note that f1 (0) < 0
while f¡1
0 (0) > 0. Hence, f1 (0)¡f¡1














f1 (x) ¡ f¡1
0 (x)
¤
is strictly bounded away from 0, and so f1 (x) ¡ f¡1
0 (x) ! 1 as x ! 1.
The existence of v¤
0 follows from continuity. This implies there is a unique social solution to the social
planner’s problem.
Next, I need to show that if at the optimum Ri > 0 for both i, then R0 > R1. The proof proceeds in
two steps. First, I argue that v¤
1 > v¤
0. Since Ri > 0, the asset equations imply
v¤
¡i =

























Consider the value b vi which solves


































< 1, we know that for any x < b v1, it must be the case that
x ¡ f
¡1
0 (x) < 0 . Hence,
f1 (b v0) ¡ f
¡1




where the inequality uses the fact that b v0 > b v1. Since f1 (v¤
0) ¡ f¡1
0 (v¤
0) = 0 and f1 (x) ¡ f¡1
0 (x) is
increasing in x, it follows that v¤





> 1, the fact that f1 (b v0) = b v0 implies f1 (x) > x
for any x > b v0. Hence, f1 (v¤
0) > v¤
0. But since v¤
1 = f1 (v¤
0), it follows that v¤
1 > v¤
0.










, which is su¢cient to establish R1 < R0 from the
…rst-order condition above. Since v¤
¡i ¡ f¡i (v¤






















































But given the expression for Ri in (5.2), this implies R0 > R1.
Finally, suppose Ri = 0 for some i. The proposition follows if we can rule out the case where R0 = 0










denote the values of v¤




































































> > > > <
> > > > :
(L ¡ R1)Áln¸
Á(L ¡ R1)ln¸ + ®ÁR1 ln¸
v1
Z1
if R1 > 0
(½ + ¹)Z0L1¡®
(½ + ¹)Z1L1¡® + ¹(Z0L1¡® + A) ¡ (½ + 2¹)·
v1
Z1





½ + ¹ ¡ (1 ¡ ®)ÁR¡i ln¸
@v1
@Z1
where A is de…ned by
Z0L1¡® + A = max
R0
n
Z0 (L ¡ R0)
1¡® + (1 ¡ ®)v0ÁR0 ln¸
o




































, where !(L) = ½ + ¹ + (1 ¡ (1 ¡ ®)ln¸)ÁL. There
exists a unique »
¤ > 0 such that 1 ¡ »
¤ T h(»
¤) if » S »
¤. This unique solution »
¤ lies in the interval
(0;1).
Proof of Lemma 1: First, I claim there exists a »
¤ 2 (0;1) for which 1 ¡ » = h(»). This is
straightforward: if » = 0, we have
1 ¡ » = 1 > 0 = h(»)
while if » = 1, we have











where the inequality relies on the fact that ! (L) > 0 given that ½ > (1 ¡ ®)ÁLln¸. The claim follows
from continuity.
To prove »






























Since h(») > 1¡» at at » = 1, a necessary condition for there to exist a »
¤ > 1 such that 1¡»
¤ = h(»
¤)
is that there exists a » > 1 such that h0 (») < ¡1. Thus, there exists no » > 1 for which 1 ¡ » = h(»).
Next, I need to show there is a unique »
¤ 2 (0;1) for which 1 ¡ »
¤ = h(»
¤). Consider …rst the case
where ® > 1









For ® > 1

















































¤ is unique and that 1 ¡ »
¤ T h(»
¤) if » S »
¤
If ® = 1









2 which is monotonically increasing in » while 1 ¡ » is
monotonically decreasing. This again insures »
¤ is unique and 1 ¡ »
¤ T h(»
¤) if » S »
¤Finally, if ® < 1
2, we can establish uniqueness by showing that h0 (») > ¡1 for all » 2 (0;1]. Di¤eren-



























which for ® < 1
2 is strictly greater than 1.
But it was previously argued that h0 (») > ¡1 for all » ¸ 1. Hence, h0 (») > ¡1 for all » 2 (0;1) if
® < 1
2.
Lastly, since at » = 0, 1 ¡ » = 1 > 0 = h(»), continuity implies 1 ¡ » > h(») for all » < »
¤. Likewise,
at » = 1, 1¡» = 0 < h(1), so by continuity it follows that 1¡» < h(») for » > »
¤. This establishes the
lemma. ¥
Proof of Proposition 2: Since Ri ¸ 0, the case where R1 = 0 trivially satis…es the claim. If R0 = 0,
we need to verify that R1 = 0. To show this, suppose not, i.e. suppose R1 > 0 = R0. Then it follows




























Since v1(R1;R0) = 0 if R1 = L, then R1 < L in any such equilibrium. This allows us to de…ne » such
that
R0 = »R1 + (1 ¡ »)L
Note that since R1 < L, by construction, » ¸ 0, and R0 > R1 implies » 2 [0;1) while R0 < R1 implies
» > 1. After substituting in for !(R) and rewriting R0 in terms of R1, we can rewrite the inequality
v1 ¸ v0 in terms of »:













Applying lemma 1, it follows that » < »
¤ < 1, which implies R0 > R1, a contradiction. Thus, R0 = 0
implies R1 = 0.
Finally, if R1 and R0 are both positive, it must be true that v1 = v0 =
1
Á
, so once again we can de…ne
R0 = »R1+(1 ¡ »)L which in turn implies that 1¡» = h(»). But from the lemma, the unique »
¤ which
satis…es this equation is less than 1, which implies R0 ¸ R1.
Next, I show that there exists a unique symmetric Markov-perfect equilibrium when ¸ < e
1
1¡®. This
condition implies that (1 ¡ ®)ln¸ < 1, which implies
!0 (R) = (1 ¡ (1 ¡ ®)ln¸)Á > 0







from the proof of Proposition 2 that in any Markov-perfect equilibrium in which Ávi (Ri;R¡i) = 1 forboth i, the levels of innovation for the two levels of productivity are related by R0 = »
¤R1 + (1 ¡ »
¤)L,
where »
¤ is a constant. Hence, there can be at most one equilibrium in which Áv0 = Áv1 = 1. For
suppose there were two such equilibria, (R0;R1) 6= (R0
0;R0
1) where wlog R0
0 > R0. Since »
¤ is constant,
it follows that R0











If (R0;R1) = (0;0) is an equilibrium, given that
@vi
@Ri
< 0, it follows that for any (R0;R1) 6= 0 there
always exists some i 2 f0;1g such that Ávi < 1 but Ri > 0, which is inconsistent with equilibrium. In
this case, (0;0) would be the unique equilibrium. Without loss of generality, then, I henceforth assume
that if an equilibrium exists, it is not equal to (0;0).








= 1 for both i,
there exists no other equilibria in which Ri = 0 and Ávi (0;R¡i) < 1 for some i 2 f0;1g. For each i,
de…ne the contour sets
-i = f(Ri;R¡i) j Ávi (Ri;R¡i) = 1g
for all values of (R0;R1) ¸ (0;0). These sets are illustrated in Figure A2. Using the implicit function






are both strictly negative, we can establish that the graphs of
-i form connected, downward sloping curves in (R0;R1) space. If there exists an equilibrium (R¤
0;R¤
1) 6=
















= 1, then Ávi (R¤
i;0) > 1. Since Ávi (L;0) = 0, there exists an R0
i ¸ 0 such that
(R0
i;0) 2 -i by continuity. Hence, The graph of -i intersects the Ri axis.
Next, de…ne R00





= 1. If no such value exists, I adopt
the convention that R00
¡i = 1. I now argue that R00
1 > R0
1. The statement follows trivially if R00
1 = 1. If
R00
1 < 1, I argue that Áv1 (R00
1;0) > 1. For suppose not, i.e. suppose Áv1 (R00
1;0) · 1. Since Áv0 (0;R00
1) =
1, it follows that either (0;R00




1 ;0) = 1, from which it follows that (0;R000
1 ) is an equilibrium. Since R0 ¸ R1 in any Markov-
perfect equilibrium, it follows that R00
1 = R000
1 = 0. Since Áv0 (R¤
0;R¤
1) = 1 and (R¤
0;R¤




< 0 implies Áv0 (0;0) > 1, a contradiction. Hence, Áv1 (R00
1;0) > 1 = Áv1 (R0
1;0). Since
vi is decreasing in Ri, it follows that R00
1 > R0
1 as claimed.
The fact that R00
1 > R0
1 can be used to establish that R00
0 > R0











¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
Áv0=1
To see this, consider a neighborhood around (R¤
0;R¤
1). Recall that for any admissible (R0;R1) where R0
is de…ned as »R1 +(1 ¡ »)L for some » ¸ 0, the proof of Proposition 2 above implies that v1 (R1;R0) >
v0 (R0;R1) if and only if 1 ¡ » > h(»), which from Lemma 1 holds if and only if » < »
¤. Since for any
" > 0, R¤
0 + " = »R¤
1 + (1 ¡ »)L for some » < »
¤, it follows that
v1 (R¤
1;R¤































derivative of 1 ¡ » ¡ h(») with respect to » would be equal to 0 at » = »
¤, which is contradicted by the
proof of Lemma 1 above. Similarly, for any " > 0, Lemma 1 implies
v0 (R¤
0;R¤
1 + ") > v1 (R¤
1 + ";R¤
0)






























¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
Áv0=1
Since there can be only one point at which Ávi (Ri;R¡i) = 1, the two contours sets -i intersect only at
(R¤
0;R¤
1), and by continuity it follows that R00
0 > R0
0.
With these observations, I can …nally establish that there exists no other equilibrium
³
b Ri; b R¡i
´
in




< 1. This is because if such an equilibrium existed,









= 1 by de…nition, monotonicity
implies b R¡i ¸ R00
¡i > R0
¡i. But since R¡i > R0
¡i, it follows that Áv¡i (R¡i;0) < 1. For this to be an
equilibrium, b R¡i = 0. But since there exists an (R¤
0;R¤






= 1, it follows
that Ávi (0;0) > 1, a contradiction.
Finally, suppose there exists no pair (R¤
0;R¤
1) such that Áv0 (R¤
0;R¤
1) = Áv1 (R¤
0;R¤
1) = 1. We need to
establish that there still exists a unique Markov-perfect equilibrium. Suppose …rst that Áv0 (0;0) · 1.
Then for any (R0;R1) ¸ (0;0) where (R0;R1) 6= (0;0), it must be the case that Áv0 (R0;R1) < 1. This
implies R0 = 0 in any equilibrium, and since R0 ¸ R1 in any equilibrium according to Proposition 2,
R0 = R1 = 0 must be the unique equilibrium. If we rewrite R0 as »R1 +(1 ¡ »)L, then » = 1 > »
¤. But
recall from Lemma 1 that this implies v1 (0;0) < v0 (0;0). Since Áv0 (0;0) · 1, it follows that (0;0) is in
fact an equilibrium.
This leaves the case where (i) there exists no pair (R¤
0;R¤
1) such that Áv0 (R¤
0;R¤
1) = Áv1 (R¤
0;R¤
1) = 1
and (ii) Áv0 (0;0) > 1. By continuity, there exists an R0
0 < L such that Áv0 (R0
0;0) = 1. Then I claim
(R0;R1) = (R0
0;0) is the unique Markov perfect equilibrium. Consider again two cases. First, supposethat Áv1 (0;0) · 1. In that case, monotonicity implies Áv1 (0;R0
0) < 1 given that R0
0 > 0, so that
Áv1 (0;R0
0) · 1 and (R0
0;0) is indeed an equilibrium. Moreover, since Áv1 (0;0) · 1, then R1 = 0 in any
equilibrium, and it follows that (R0
0;0) is the unique equilibrium. Lastly, suppose Áv1 (0;0) > 1. Once
again, de…ne R00
0 such that Áv0 (0;R00
0) = 1, with the convention of setting R00
0 = 1 if no such value exists.
We need to show that R0
0 > R00
0, which insures Áv1 (0;R0
0) · 1. Suppose not, i.e. suppose R00
0 ¸ R0
0.




0, then by continuity -0




0) · 1, so that (R0
0;0) is an equilibrium, and since R1 = 0 in any equilibrium, which insures the
equilibrium above is unique.¥





















De…ne yi = L ¡ Ri. Using the assumption that Ri < L implies yi 6= 0, we can rearrange the condition






(¸ ¡ 1)(1 ¡ ®)
(1 ¡ (1 ¡ ®)ln¸)Áy =
¸(! (L) + ¹)
(¸ ¡ 1)(1 ¡ ®)
(5.4)
The LHS of this equation is monotonically increasing in y, and ranges from 0 to 1 as y ranges from 0
to 1. Since the RHS above is strictly positive, there exists a unique value y¤ for which the equation is
satis…ed. This translates into a unique solution R¤ = L ¡ y¤.
Equation (5.4) further implies that y¤ is monotonically increasing in ·. Taking limits, y¤ ! 0 as
· ! 0 and y¤ ! L +
½ + 2¹
(1 ¡ (1 ¡ ®)ln¸)Á
as · ! 1. If we evaluate vi (R¤;R¤) and substitute in from
(5.4), we obtain
vi = (¸ ¡ 1)
µ





(! (L ¡ y) + ¹)¸·(y¤)
®
(¸ ¡ 1)(1 ¡ ®)Zi
!2 (L ¡ y¤
·) ¡ ¹2
= (¸ ¡ 1)
µ







!2 (L ¡ y¤) ¡ ¹2
=
(¸ ¡ 1)y¤
! (L ¡ y¤) + ¹





(1 ¡ (1 ¡ ®)ln¸)Á
¶
, vi ranges between 0 and 1. The existence of ·¤ follows from
continuity. ¥
Proof of Proposition 4: Consider a …xed value · > ·¤, where ·¤ is de…ned in Lemma 2. As in the
proof of Lemma 2, it will be useful to work with yi = L ¡ Ri. Consider the set
S = f(y0;y1) j v0 (L ¡ y0;L ¡ y1) = v1 (L ¡ y1;L ¡ y0)gThe proposition follows if I can show that within this set there exists an element (y0;y1) 2 S such that
y0 > y1 and Ávi (L ¡ yi;L ¡ y¡i) = 1 for i 2 f0;1g.
Consider …rst the case where y1 = 0. For this value, we have
v0 =
(¸ ¡ 1)! (L)y0 ¡




! (L ¡ y0)! (L) ¡ ¹2
v1 = 0
Hence, there are exactly two values of y0 for which v0 (L ¡ y0;L) = v1 (L;L ¡ y0), namely y0 = 0 and
y0 = e y0 ´
·
(! (L) + ¹)¸·
! (L)(¸ ¡ 1)(1 ¡ ®)Z0
¸ 1
1¡®
By the implicit function theorem, there exist continuous functions y0 (¢) de…ned in a neighborhood of
y1 = 0 such that y0 (y1) ! 0 and y0 (y1) ! e y0 as y1 ! 0 which satisfy v0 (L ¡ y0 (y1);L ¡ y1) =
v0 (L ¡ y1;L ¡ y0 (y1)).
For y1 6= 0, we can rewrite the equation v0 = v1 in terms of y1 and » =
y0
y1
. The condition that v1 = v0
can be rewritten as
¸·y®¡1
1
Z1 (¸ ¡ 1)(1 ¡ ®)
(A0 ¡ A1» ¡ A2»






(1 ¡ (1 ¡ ®)ln¸)Áy1
! (L)
A2 =


















For notational convenience, I will rewrite (5.5) more compactly as
Q(»;y1) = 0
The implicit functions y0 (y1) described above which limit to 0 and e y0 establish the existence of functions






and » = 1, respectively, as y1 ! 0.
De…ne y¤ as in Lemma 2. Di¤erentiate Q(»;y1) with respect to » twice to obtain
@2Q
@»
2 = h00 (») + ®(1 ¡ ®)
¸·»
®¡2
Z1 (¸ ¡ 1)(1 ¡ ®)
A2y
®¡1
1Substituting in for h00 (»), we obtain
@2Q
@»












































is decreasing in y1. Hence, if we can show that
@2Q
@»
2 > 0 for some y0
1, it follows that
@2Q
@»
2 > 0 for all
y1 · y0
1. For y1 = y¤, we know from the proof of Lemma 2 that y¤ satis…es
¸·(y¤)
®¡1
Z1 (¸ ¡ 1)(1 ¡ ®)
=
¹

























Hence, for all y1 · y¤, Q(»;y1) is convex in ». This will prove important in what follows.
Before I proceed, I introduce the notation (y0;y1) Ã (y0
0;y0
1) to denote the case in which there exists
a continuous mapping y1 (¿) > 0 and a continuous mapping y0 (¿) de…ned for ¿ 2 (0;1) such that
1. lim
¿!0
y1 (¿) = y1 and lim
¿!0
y0 (¿) = y0
2. lim
¿!1
y1 (¿) = y0
1 and lim
¿!1
y0 (¿) = y0
0





y (¿) = 1 denotes, as usual, that for every N > 0, there exists a ¿N such that y(¿) >
N for all ¿ > ¿N. Thus, we can describe a path in which y0
i = 1 for some i. Note that if we can establish
that (y¤;y¤) Ã (e y0;0), the statement of the proposition follows from a simple continuity argument: since
Áv0 (L ¡ y¤;L ¡ y¤) > 1 for · > ·¤ but Áv0 (e y0;0) = 0, there exists some ¿ for which (y0 (¿);y1 (¿)) 2 S
and where Ávi (L ¡ yi (¿);L ¡ y¡i (¿)) = 1. Since v0 (L ¡ y;L ¡ y) = v1 (L ¡ y;L ¡ y) if and only if
y = y¤, and since e y0 > 0, it follows that y0 (¿) > y1 (¿) by continuity.
I now break down my analysis into di¤erent cases, depending on the sign of
@Q
@»
evaluated at » = 1
and y1 = y¤. For convenience, a graphical view of the set S corresponding to each of the three cases (for




I claim this is enough to establish that (y¤;y¤) Ã (e y0;0), which from above is enough to establish the
proposition. I …rst argue that there exists a y0











> 0 for all y1, it follows that Q(1;y1) < 0 for all y1 < y¤. Furthermore,
since Q(»;y¤) is convex in », it also follows that Q(»;y¤) > 0 for all » > 1. By continuity, then, the
assumption that (y¤;y¤) 6Ã (1;y1) for all y1 2 (0;y¤) implies that for each y1 2 (0;y¤) there must exist
some » (y1) > 1 such that Q(» (y1);y1) > 0. Applying the intermediate value theorem, we can deduce
that for every y1 2 (0;y¤) there exists a »
¤ (y1) > 1 such that Q(»
¤ (y1);y1) = 0. Since Q is continuous
and convex in » for all y1 · y¤, the root »
¤ (y1) is the unique value of » > 1 such that Q(»
¤ (y1);y1) = 1,
is continuous in y1, and limy1"y¤
· »
¤ (y1) = 1. Hence, (y¤;y¤) Ã (»
¤ (y1);y1). Taking the limit as y1 # 0, it
follows that (y¤;y¤) Ã (e y0;0), since the unique root greater than one for which lim
y1!0
Q(»;y1) = 0 limits












all y1 > 0, there can exist at most one y1 for which lim
»!1
Q(»;y1) = 0. Since lim
»!1
Q(»;0) = 0, it follows





Since Q(1;y¤) is strictly convex, it follows that Q(»;y¤) > 0 for all » 6= 1. The fact that (y¤;y¤) Ã





In this case, the arguments above can no longer be used to establish that (y¤;y¤) Ã (e y0;0). However,





> 1 along any such connecting path. As I argue below, this condition is also su¢cient to
establish the proposition.
Again, the proof is by contradiction. Suppose the claim is false, i.e. suppose (y¤;y¤) 6Ã (e y0;0) and
(y¤;y¤) 6Ã (1;y1) for all y1 > 0, including y1 = 1. If we di¤erentiate » with respect to y1 along the
curve Q(»;y1) = 0, we obtain
d»
dy1






where the last inequality follows from the fact that
@Q(1;y1)
@y1
> 0 for all y1. Hence, if (y¤;y¤) Ã (y0;y1)
for some y0 > y¤, it follows from continuity and the uniqueness of y¤ that y0 > y1. Next, since
(y¤;y¤) 6Ã (1;y1) for all y1 (including y1 = 1) by assumption, it follows that
y = supfy0 j (y¤;y¤) Ã (y0;y1) for some y1g
is …nite. It follows that for any y0 > y¤, it must be the case that (y¤;y¤) 6Ã (y0;y1) if y1 ¸ y. Thus,
any continuous path that originates at (y¤;y¤) for which y0 (¿) > y¤ is bounded in its y1 term from





= 1. Since y0 (¿) · y for all ¿, this requires that lim
¿!1
y1 (¿) = 0. But this contradicts





> 1 along this path.




> 1 implies there exists
a solution (y0;y1) with y0 > y1 such that Áv0 (L ¡ y0;L ¡ y1) = Áv1 (L ¡ y1;L ¡ y0) = 1. Consider
lim











(!(L ¡ y¡i) + ¹)¸·





!(L ¡ yi)!(L ¡ y¡i) ¡ ¹2
As yi ! 1, the numerator converges to §1, depending on the sign of ! (L ¡ y¡i), and since ! (L ¡ yi) !
¡1, the denominator converges to §1, again depending on the sign of ! (L ¡ y¡i). Applying L’Hopital’s
rule, we obtain
lim
yi!1vi (L ¡ yi;L ¡ y¡i) = ¡
(¸ ¡ 1)!(L ¡ y¡i)
!0 (¢)! (L ¡ y¡i)
< 0
Hence, since v0 (L ¡ y0;L ¡ y1) < 0 as y0 ! 1, it follows by continuity that there exists a pair (y0;y1)
such that Ávi (L ¡ yi;L ¡ y¡i) = 1. Again, since v0 (L ¡ y;L ¡ y) = v1 (L ¡ y;L ¡ y) if and only if




> 1, it follows that y0 (¿) > y1 (¿) by continuity.
Remark: all cases for
@Q(1;y¤)
@»
are possible, depending on parameter values. In cases II and III, there
will be multiple solutions to the problem Ávi (Ri;R¡i) = 1, i.e. in addition to the solution identi…ed
above, there also exists a second solution with R0 > R1. However, the existence of multiple solutions
need not imply multiple equilibria, since these solutions may involve negative values of Ri. ¥
Proof of Proposition 5: Given that …rms maximize expected pro…ts, a …rm that has successfully








Suppose the solution in Proposition 4 is an equilibrium. The Proposition follows if we can show that
s = 0. Clearly, if Zt+s = Zt, there is no bene…t from delay, since vt+s = vt and so in the best case
scenario the …rm becomes the leader and earns vt discounted at a positive rate. Thus, given other agents
are implementing immediately and innovating in accordance with Proposition 4, a …rm will only delay
implementation until a change in the level of productivity. If the current level of productivity is equal
to Z1, then given v0 = v1 =
1
Á















assuming the …rm is the leading producer when it implements. Since R1 > R0, it follows that this is less















< 1. Moreover, by continuity, the solution (R0;R1) identi…ed in Proposition
4 limits to (R¤;R¤) as · ! ·¤. Thus, there will be no bene…t from delay even though R1 > R0 for ·
close to ·¤.Figure 1

























Growth rate, real R&D expenditures
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Growth in R&D Measures vs. Growth in Real GDP
(Shaded regions denote NBER recessions)Figure 2
Source: National Science Foundation and S&P's Compustat database
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Growth in R&D in Relatively Unconstrained Firms
(Shaded regions denote NBER recessions)
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Optimal R&D as a function of capital ratio k
Equilibrium R&D as a function of capital ratio k

















































































Figure A2: Uniqueness of Markov-Perfect Equilibrium 
v0 
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v1 = f1(v0) 
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Panel (A) corresponds to Case I in proof of Proposition 4 
Panel (B) corresponds to Case II in proof of Proposition 4 
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